By Richard Langhorne
This number of specifically commissioned essays has been assembled as a tribute to Professor F. H. Hinsley, the key historian of British wartime intelligence. Strategic issues contain the fast cave in of France in 1940, Britain's reaction to it, and Russia's call for for a moment entrance in Europe after she entered the battle in 1941. significant diplomatic difficulties also are thought of: the administration of the British overseas workplace in the course of the interval of appeasement, the right way to hinder Franco's Spain from becoming a member of the Axis, the way to deal with the placement in Yugoslavia following Tito's successes with the Partisans, and Roosevelt's doctrine of 'unconditional surrender'. The e-book concludes with an review of the case opposed to Germany over the invasion of Norway because it got here sooner than the Nuremberg Tribunal.
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Extra info for Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley
Dupuy and other retired American military officers in the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO). 7 The shortcomings of such a compilation notwithstanding, it does yield two propositions upon close examination. 8 The other is that if an historical pattern in the relationship between offence and defence can be found, that pattern will not unfold, in either cyclical or monotonic fashion, across different wars, but rather will cover developments within wars.
But the pattern put forward by Liddell Hart rests, like the others, on a crude technological determinism, namely the assumption that an innovation inherently favours either the offence or the defence. 6 If what really matters is which side adapts an innovation to its own purposes in the most timely and effective way, any pattern or rule of thumb that pretends to cross-national or long-term validity must be suspect. In this connection, note that in the cases selected by Liddell Hart to sustain his pattern in the twentieth century, those who held out in defensive postures against heavy numerical odds were, by and large, Germans.
1 Even where subsequent historical work on military issues has not been merely the continuation of such politics by other means, it has failed effectively to transcend the terms of debate set by political figures of the bygone era itself. Whenever there develops such a tangle around a major historical question, one should ponder anew the question itself, to see if it has been malposee. In this case, it seems indeed to have been misconceived. For one can judge a certain level of armament sufficient or insufficient only in relation to a certain strategy.